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By CoRwiN D. EDWARDS*
The scope of efforts by the United States Government to main-
tain competition has been substantially broadened during the last
fifteen years. Although the Sherman Act expressed governmental
policy since 1890, this policy was thought, during more than 40
years, to be applicable in domestic law enforcement rather than
in foreign policy. The antitrust laws were enforced in the domestic
market with varying but, on the whole, growing success, but they
could not be enforced overseas and the encouragement of com-
petition outside our borders was not considered a diplomatic ob-
jective. Relatively unsuccessful efforts were made to enforce the
antitrust laws against monopolies that controlled significant imports.
Beginning in 1918, exports were exempted from the antitrust laws
provided the restrictions imposed upon foreign sales did not also
restrict the domestic market or coerce independent exporters. Most
Americans presumed that other governments were not concerned
with problems of monopoly, that the United States constituted a
competitive enclave in a monopolistic world, and that the diffi-
culties which arose in international trade from the contact of the
competitive principle with the monopolistic principle were to be
dealt with solely by efforts to make existing law effective within
our own jurisdiction.
Since the war, the United States has followed a different policy.
This policy rests upon the presumption that the governments of
countries in which there is private enterprise have a common in-
terest in curbing many monopolistic practices and that the interest
of the United States is served by encouraging other countries to
adopt policies expressing that interest. Accordingly, the United
States Government has tried to develop procedures for joint action
with other governments about monopoly problems. Declarations of
policy and pledges of action with reference to such problems have
become common in international understandings about trade, inter-
national loans, and internatioal grants of assistance. Efforts have
been made to encourage the enactment of antimonopoly legislation
in other countries and to devise an international organization
against restrictive business practices.
Missionary enthusiasm has had little to do with this change.
Indeed, many of those who developed and applied the new policy
did so reluctantly, suspecting that misplaced zeal accounted for the
proposals which were brought to them and in turn being suspected
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of misplaced zeal after they adhered to these proposals. The change
of policy was probably retarded by a wide-spread feeling among
government officials that foreign governments could not be ex-
pected to take monopoly problems seriously and that American
attitudes toward monopoly were inconsistent with the traditions
and systems of law of foreign countries. Such doubts were over-
come partly by specific instances in which monopolistic conditions
overseas were harmful to American interests and partly by re-
iterated discovery that foreign governments were more frequently
concerned about monopoly problems than had been anticipated.
A major influence in arousing American interest in monopolis-
tic conditions abroad was the fact that early in the war the investi-
gations of Congressional committees and of the Department of
Justice established a close relationship between certain internation-
al cartels and the economic objectives of totalitarian states. In
Germany and Japan, and to a lesser extent in Italy, private busi-
ness had been brought so far under government control that when
great business enterprises participated in international business
negotiations they often did so for political objectives as well as
for their own business purposes. In non-totalitarian countries, busi-
ness interests were seldom coordinated with the political interests
of governments. When cartel arrangements were made between
the business enterprises of the democracies ana those of the totali-
tarian states, the resulting restrictions often served a totalitarian
political purpose as well as a monopolistic business purpose. Thus
in particular instances, restrictions were imposed upon the pro-
ductive capacity, technological development, or current produc-
tion of strategic industries in democratic states without equiva-
lent restrictions in totalitarian states; markets for strategic equip-
ment were allocated in such a way that democratic states were
made dependent upon supplies flowing from totalitarian states; a
one-way flow of technological information was established from
the business enterprises of democratic states to those of totalitarian
states, in extreme cases associated with a flow of military secrets;
trade was associated with totalitarian political propaganda and used
to reward the political friends of totalitarianism or to discipline
its political enemies; and properties belonging to the business en-
terprises of totalitarian states and markets allocated to them were
protected from wartime loss by a false cloak of ownership or by
a temporary transfer to cartel partners in other countries. More-
over, after war broke out, the continued alliance of business enter-
prises on both sides of the battle lines with cartel partners in
neutral countries created dangerous possibilities of a flow of re-
stricted information to enemy enterprises. As these patterns became
clear, there was a tendency to exaggerate them, particularly by
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attributing to cartelization effects that were inherent in the fact
that the larger business enterprises of the totalitarian states had
overseas branches and conducted overseas trade. Apart from such
exaggerations, however, it was evident that various business enter-
prises in the democracies had failed to see the political implications
of cartel arrangements or had acquiesced in them, and that be-
cause these enterprises had based their trade policy upon carteli-
zation they could not adapt themselves to the political needs of
belligerency without substantial embarrassment.
Although such political and strategic problems were important
in creating a wide-spread interest in international aspects of mo-
nopoly, they lost their central position soon after the close of hos-
tilities. The fact that post-war imperialism has been communistic
has prevented the use of international cartels as instruments of
imperialistic political sabotage or penetration since the war. The
concern which was felt at the war's end lest international carteli-
zation become a means to the re-establishment of German or Jap-
anese imperialism has diminished greatly- in each case, largely
because of new political alignments. If policy toward cartels were
solely a matter of their military significance, the United States
probably would be little concerned today with such policy.
But the United States is interested in overseas aspects of the
monopoly problem because they are also closely related to the
economics of reconstruction in Europe and Asia and to the long-
run economic objectives of our foreign policy. The significance of
monopoly for foreign policy has become evident in relation to
three sets of objectives.
The first is the establishment of levels of productivity and
trade sufficient to make war-shattered countries self-sustaining.
The interest of the United States in restoring productivity arises,
in part, from the close relation between our own prosperity and sta-
bility and the prosperity and stability of other countries with which
we maintain economic intercourse. In a narrower sense, it springs
from the fact that until normal production and normal trade are re-
stored we carry a direct burden of foreign assistance in the form of
grants or loans.
The effect of various cartel restrictions overseas has been to
retard recovery and limit productivity. In a cartel which fixes
prices, for example, the tendency is to satisfy all the participants
by setting the price high enough to provide a profit even for the
least efficient in the industry. The result is to keep inefficient
concerns alive and to prevent the expansion of consumption which
might take place at lower prices. This type of scheme is frequently
accompanied by an allocation of markets or a restriction of output,
which further protects the inefficient concerns by preventing the
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most efficient from increasing their productive capacity and their
volume of sale as they might otherwise be tempted to do by their
high profits. In some cases, such burdens upon productivity are
associated with agreements designed to prevent introduction of
new technological processes and erection of new capacity so long
as such changes would jeopardize the value of existing investments.
In an economy that carries burdens such as these, the restoration
of satisfactory levels of production, employment, and trade is un-
necessarily difficult.
The second objective is the fostering of multilateral interna-
tional trade, relatively free from trade barriers. For this purpose,
the United States has sought for 20 years to negotiate reciprocal
reductions of tariffs on a mutually advantageous basis and to pro-
mote the elimination of a wide variety of quantitative restrictions
on trade imposed by governments. Such a policy can be defeated,
however, by the private activity of international cartels. One of
the most common patterns of international restriction imposed by
cartels is the allocation of national markets to particular business
enterprises. In such a scheme, great international concerns agree
not to invade one another's home markets and to divide the mar-
kets of other countries among themselves. If all significant pro-
ducers are parties to the agreement, the effect may be the equiva-
lent of a series of governmental trade embargoes. In particular
instances, such a system of market sharing may divide one or more
national markets among claimant enterprises on a percentage basis
or in terms of fixed quantitative limits. Such arrangements are
the exact equivalent of governmental quantitative restrictions. To
eliminate governmental trade barriers while permitting trade bar-
riers established privately is to dispense with whatever protection
may be afforded for the public interest by the use of governmental
processes, and to make it certain that systems of trade barriers
will protect private interests only where private concerns are few
enough and powerful enough to develop international private ar-
rangements for such purposes.
So far as the domestic market of the United States is concerned,
enforcement of the antitrust laws may in most cases prevent a
governmental policy of liberalizing trade from being nullified by
private action. However, the antitrust laws do not cover the alloca-
tion of export markets nor the establishment of systems of private
trade barriers among foreign countries. In Europe, particularly,
the autarchical policies of cartels provide a strong reinforcement
for tariffs and quantitative restrictions in preventing the creation
of a single European market and in thereby limiting the scale of
production and thwarting efforts to locate industry where it can
produce most efficiently. These matters are important to the United
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States in proportion as the economic unity and prosperity of Europe
are important to us.
The third objective is to raise standards of living and well-
being. Our humanitarian desire that the people of the world shall
be well-nourished and comfortable has been reinforced by a grow-
ing awareness that internal political disorder and susceptibility to
subversion from abroad are closely associated with malnutrition
and low standards of living and even more closely associated with
a belief that there is no reasonable ground for hope that living
conditions will improve. Moreover, we have begun to apply to in-
ternational trade our domestic conviction that prosperous cus-
tomers are the best guarantee of profitable commerce. The belief
that the United States has an interest, economic and political, in
a rising standard of living throughout the world has been expressed
in programs of action such as the provision of technological assist-
ance directly through the Point IV program and indirectly through
the United Nations. It is evident, however, that where cartels
restrict output, retard technological change, and charge high prices,
the impact of private cartel policy runs directly counter to the
improvement .of standards of living. If the affirmative programs
are worth pursuing, business policies that point in the opposite
direction are worth curbing.
Cartels are sometimes defended, particularly in Europe, on
the ground that they may contribute to the maintenance of stan-
dards of living. While it is usually admitted that the policies of
cartels look toward price maintenance, market sharing, limitation
of output, and the establishment of trade barriers, it is argued that
many cartels pursue such policies only within reasonable limits
and that they do so largely to protect the stability of business
operations and thereby the employment of labor and the main-
tenance of the standard of living of those employed. If there is
some sacrifice of productivity and progress, the argument runs,
the loss is more than offset by the gain in security. Most govern-
ments have accepted this kind of argument from time to time as
a justification for governmental programs of price maintenance or
market protection. In this country, for example, the operations of
the Bituminous Coal Commission were based upon such a view,
and some of our farm programs are still so based. However, even
those who give greatest weight to such considerations must rec-
ognize that when the door is opened for private restrictive ar-
rangements the restrictions will not be adopted solely when they
can be justified on such grounds, and even those restrictions that
might be justified will not be limited in scope and duration as would
be desirable on such grounds. Accordingly, the argument for sta-
bility through reasonable restriction constitutes, at most, a warn-
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ing that exceptions may need to be made in the general attack
upon international cartels -that just as legislative exceptions are
made in our own domestic policy, there may be need for adminis-
trative exceptions in our foreign policy.
Concern over the relation of cartels to recovery and produc-
tivity, to multilateral trade, and to rising standards of living has
increased during the postwar period because American funds and
American initiative appeared to be necessary to restore production
in Europe and to revive world trade, and also because the foreign
policy of imperialist Communism seeks to exploit whatever social
unrest may be created by low standardIs of living, restricted pro-
ductivity, and lack of economic cohesion among the nations of the
free world. But for these special influences, it is doubtful that the
cartel aspects of foreign policy would have been perceived so
quickly. In the long-run, however, they probably would have
emerged; for as the improvement of transportation and communica-
tion brings the world closer together and as foreign trading enter-
prises develop complex corporate structures which control signifi-
cant segments of international trade, the distinction between do-
mestic trade and foreign trade must necessarily have become less,
and discrepancies in the policies of the principal trading countries
must necessarily have given rise to greater problems.
Alongside the development of the cartel aspects of American
foreign policy, there has been a considerable growth in the pro-
portion of enforcement activity under the antitrust laws which is
devoted to international arrangements. Attacks upon international
restrictive schemes have become common now that the character
and prevalence of such arrangements is better known. With this
increase in the importance of cartel cases under the antitrust laws
has come a growing awareness that there are major difficulties in
applying our domestic law effectively to restrictive practices that
are international in character. Thus the interest in cartels as an
aspect of foreign policy has been reinforced by a belief that some of
our domestic monopoly problems cannot be satisfactorily solved
under domestic law unless our own governmental proceedings are
supplemented by appropriate action on the part of foreign govern-
ments.
The difficulties that arise when the antitrust laws are applied
to an international cartel are greatest when corporations are sub-
ject to the law and policy of one or more other countries which
tolerate or approve the restrictions attacked by the United States.
In cases in which American enterprises participate in international
cartels as exporters, the export markets may lie in countries which
allow cartels to engage freely in private disciplinary practices.
Under these circumstances, an American enterprise not partici-
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pating in a cartel may be handicapped by concerted activities de-
signed to exclude it from the market. For example, the cartel
members may collectively refuse to deal with distributors who pur-
chase the products of the American independent. There are even
occasional instances in which the cartel is fostered by the govern-
ment of the country in which it operates, so that legal barriers are
interposed to handicap the trade of independent concerns. Cir-
cumstances such as these were influential in bringing about the
adoption of the Webb-Pomerene Act. But in permitting American
exporters to act concertedly in foreign markets, that statute does
not cope directly with the problem to which it is applied. If the
exporters are powerful, they may take the lead in foreign re-
strictions. If they are weak, their joint action may be insufficient
to remove the barriers to their entry into foreign markets. In either
case, the effect of the remedy is to authorize offensive or retalia-
tory restrictions, not to create a more competitive situation.
In some instances, American companies enter foreign cartelized
markets by coming to terms with the cartel. If, in doing so, they
make themselves the instrument of the cartel in restricting the
trade of independent American exporters, they violate the law of
the United States. If the arrangement includes an undertaking by
the foreign members of the cartel to restrict their shipments to the
United States, there is also a violation of American law. If, how-
ever, the arrangement does not affect exporters who are not par-
ticipants therein and if it is concerned solely with overseas mar-
kets, it is immune under our statutes. There have been repeated
instances of attempts to conceal the portions of such an interna-
tional arrangement which pertain to the American market in order
to enjoy the benefits of such immunity.
A problem may also appear when the cartel consists of foreign
producers who control international trade in a commodity im-
ported into the United States. Since the restrictions of such a cartel
directly affect the United States, their illegality is comparable to
that of a purely domestic arrangement. However, it is relatively
easy to organize such a cartel so that the members thereof do not
come within our jurisdiction and their activities in fixing prices,
limiting shipments to this country, or allocating this country's mar-
ket to certain of their members are carried on entirely in countries
which do not condemn such activities. By selling their products to
nonparticipants before it becomes a part of American commerce,
they can avoid the application of American law.
Monopolistic restrictions upon our imports have aroused es-
pecial concern in the case of natural rubber, quinine, nitrates,
coffee, industrial diamonds, and potash. In the case of natural rub-
ber, a plan of cartel control supported by foreign governments
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during the early 1920's tripled the price at a time when most of
the world's rubber supply was being purchased by the American
automobile industry. Defensive programs for use of reclaimed rub-
ber and for the establishment of American rubber plantations over-
seas were sponsored by the United States Government, and the
Congress seriously debated a proposal that American importers
be allowed to organize buying monopolies in self-defense. In the
case of nitrates, there was intensive protest by fertilizer users, and
serious consideration was given after the First World War to fed-
eral subsidy of synthetic production to break the cartel. In the
cases of coffee and potash, restrictive programs on behalf of car-
telized foreign producers were given effect through sales agencies
serving the American market, until prosecution forced the ter-
mination of these agreements. But thereafter the old control was
continued in a form in which the cartelized producers sold the
product to American purchasers before its importation into this
country and thereby escaped the jurisdiction of the American
courts. In the case of quinine, cartel control was useil not only to
keep the price high but also to restrict the importation of cinchona
bark into the United States and thus to insure that most of the
manufacture would take place overseas.
The Second World War underlined the importance of such
foreign cartels in the cases of quinine, rubber, and industrial
diamonds. The restrictive programs for the control of both rubber
and quinine were maintained in spite of the developing emergency,
and there was reluctance to build up substantial stockpiles of either
product beyond the cartel's control for fear that the cartel's power
might be thus broken. Before this reluctance was overcome, the
producing areas were over-run by the enemy, and, in consequence,
the United States entered the war with a protective stockpile much
smaller than might otherwise have been accumulated. In the case
of industrial diamonds, the need for a stockpile on the North Ameri-
can Continent became evident, but the cartel was so reluctant to
relinquish control that it was impossible to create that stockpile
in the United States, where the war plants using industrial dia-
monds were concentrated. Instead, a compromise was negotiated
under which the cartel established a stockpile under its own con-
trol in Canada, and thus minimized the risk that its control might
be broken. An eventual antitrust proceeding against the diamond
syndicate' was grounded upon the fortuitous circumstance that
one or two small shipments of diamonds had been found in this
country under cartel control, but the court held that this was too
slender a basis upon which to assert the jurisdiction of the Ameri-
1 U.S. v. DeBeers Consolidated Mines. CCH TRADE CAsEs para. 62, 248
(1948-49).
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can courts; and had this ruling not been made, the syndicate cer-
tainly would not have allowed itself to stray under American juris-
diction a second time.
Procedural difficulties may appear in antitrust cases even
though some or all of the participants in a restrictive arrangement
are to be found within the jurisdiction of the United States and the
arrangement itself violates American law. The international char-
acter of the scheme may create problems of proof and jurisdiction
and problems in devising an appropriate remedy.
The problems of proof arise because in an international under-
taking it is possible to hold meetings and keep records in whatever
country is convenient, particularly if the participants are corporate
enterprises domiciled in more than one country. Since the laws of
the United States are more severe and the investigatory powers
of the United States more extensive than in most countries, it is
often an obvious precaution to hold cartel meetings abroad and to
skeletonize the records of cartel activities that are kept in this
country. When an American corporation has subsidiaries overseas,
it is sometimes convenient for a foreign subsidiary to participate
in the cartel while the American parent stands aloof, and it some-
times follows that the activities of the American parent are con-
sistent with the cartel agreement though there is no evidence of
direct adherence to the agreement. In such a pattern, circumstantial
evidence from corporate structure and behavior may be the sole
way to prove the responsibility of the parent; and the difficulty
of such proof may be enhanced by the fact that the officials and
records of the subsidiary are not within reach. Moreover, if the
cartel arrangement consists of an allocation of markets or an as-
signment of export quotas, an exhaustive survey of the activities
of the parent company may be necessary in order to prove by cir-
cumstantial evidence alone that its exporting practices conform to
the cartel agreement. Yet there are formidable difficulties in ob-
taining access to cartel records located abroad.
The difficulty of obtaining evidence with reference to an inter-
national arrangement is illustrated by the problems that confronted
a grand jury investigating an alleged international petroleum cartel
in 1952.2 An effort was made to subpoena the records of interna-
tional oil companies which were thought to be relevant to the
charge that there was a world-wide agreement to limit crude oil
production, to allocate business in refined products, and to fix prices.
Many of the records which were called for were physically located
beyond the boundaries of the United States. In certain instances,
there were legal requirements that particular classes of records
2 The Economist, August 30, 1952, and The Washington Post, November 18,
1952, p. 35.
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must be kept within a particular country. The governments of two
foreign countries served notice upon the oil companies they would
not be permitted to comply with the American subpoena in cases
in which production of the ilocuments called for would be regarded
as inconsistent with the national interests of the countries in ques-
tion. Even in the absence of such formal obstacles, there are obvious
difficulties in making sure that compliance with such a subpoena
has been complete.
The problems of jurisdiction are closely related to those of
evidence. Foreign subsidiaries and their officials are not directly
within the reach of American law. To proceed against the parent
company and its officials for the acts of subsidiaries may be diffi-
cult; for such a proceeding can be successful only if the chain of
responsibility can be clearly demonstrated. If subsidiaries are allow-
ed considerable discretion, this fact weakens the chain. If control
is exercised through a block of stock constituting less than an ab-
solute majority of the voting shares, or through other devices which
leave the fact of control open to dispute, the existence of the chain
may be difficult to demonstrate. If the American company is itself
the subsidiary and the overseas corporation the parent, there may
be a practical impossibility in proceeiling against the subordinate
on the theory that it is responsible for acts over which it apparent-
ly had no control. The possibilities of devising complex corporate
structures are numerous, and when the corporate parts thereof
lie in different countries, subject to the vagaries of several differ-
ent kinds of corporation law, the possibilities of concealing portions
of the structure are also numerous. The courts of a single country
are by no means sure of achieving effective jurisdiction over a busi-
ness entity even though it does business regularly within the
country's borders.
An illustration of such jurisdictional difficulties is the first
potash case3 instituted by the Department of Justice in 1927. That
restrictions were being imposed upon the sale of imported potash
in this country was not in dispute. Nevertheless, the Attorney Gen-
eral found it necessary to accept a consent decree which enjoined
the illegal acts if they were performed in this country but rec-
ognized the right of the defendants to continue the same restrictions
provided they undertook them overseas and disposed of the product
before it entered American commerce.
When the problems of proof and jurisdiction have been suc-
cessfully met, difficulties may arise in devising a satisfactory
remedy. In some cases, the steps which an American court thinks
necessary in breaking up a cartel are inconsistent with the legal
obligations of the defendant in a foreign jurisdiction. Thus an
3 U.S. v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D!N.Y. 1929).
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American court may set aside a cartel contract as contrary to pub-
lic policy but a foreign court may entertain a suit for breach of
that contract and may award damages to foreign companies that
have suffered from the failure to live up to the cartel agreement
and that are not themselves subject to the American court's order.
In particular instances, a foreign court may order performance of
the contract and thus expose the defendant in the American case
to judicial penalties overseas if he complies with the order of the
American court.
An example of the ineffectiveness of a court decree, where
acts in other countries are involved, is to be found in the recent
case against Imperial Chemical Industries and duPont.4 These two
companies were found guilty of a world-wide conspiracy to allocate
markets by interchanging patent rights. A part of the conspiracy
had been to give Imperial Chemical Industries a monopoly of the
products of both companies in the market of the United Kingdom
and to give duPont a corresponding monopoly in the United States.
During the pendency of the cases, the very valuable British patents
for nylon, which had been exclusively licensed by duPont to Im-
perial Chemical Industries, were transferred to the ownership of
Imperial Chemical Industries. The American court found that this
transfer had been made for the specific purpose of evading the
jurisdiction of the court. Accordingly, it ordered Imperial Chemical
Industries to return the patents to duPont and ordered duPont to
make them generally available by license on non-discriminatory
terms. Meanwhile, however, Imperial Cliemical Industries had
given an exclusive United Kingdom license to another British com-
pany, British Nylon Spinners, Ltd., 50 percent of whose stock is
owned by Imperial Chemical Industries. British Nylon Spinners
sued in a British court to enjoin Imperial Chemical Industries from
complying with the order of the American court on the ground that
compliance would invalidate the exclusive license held by British
Nylon Spinners and would thus wrongfully deprive a bystander
of valuable property interests. The British court provisionally sus-
tained the contention by granting a temporary injunction. The mat-
ter now awaits final adjudication.
Another illustration has appeared in the case against the in-
candescent lamp cartel. 5 The American courts have found that this
cartel was organized primarily for the purpose of assuring a mo-
nopoly of the North American market for incandescent lamps by
General Electric and Westinghouse, and that the operations of the
cartel included a great variety of restrictive practices, one of which
4 U.S. v. LC.I., et al, 105 F.Supp. 215 (1953).
5 U.S. v. General Electric Co. 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949). Final judgment
entered October 2, 1953, CCH 1953 Trade cases, para. 67, 576.
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was the establishment of a system of exclusive patent licenses de-
signed to allocate the world market. Some of the European par-
ticipants in the scheme were beyond the jurisdiction of the Ameri-
can court. One, however, N. V. Philips, had a branch doing business
in the United States. A part of the relief granted by the American
court consisted in a requirement that Philips must license its Ameri-
can patents to independent interests as well as to General Electric
and Westinghouse. But the inventions which are subject to the
American patents are also subject to patents in other countries.
Hence the court feared that an American independent producer,
operating under a license for a United States patent granted in ac-
cord with the court's order, might be unable to export to Europe
because Philips would be able to bring suit on a charge that the
corresponding patents in European countries were infringed when
the lamps were sold there. To make possible the participation of
American independent companies in export trade, the court re-
quired Philips to grant its American licensees immunity from suit
under the corresponding foreign patents so far as shipments from
the United States were concerned. The decree made no attempt to
require Philips to license American or other companies to produce
in Europe under the Philips' patents. The Dutch government of-
ficially protested the court decree on the ground that it constitutes
an effort to control the activity of a Dutch corporation in Holland
with reference to the use there of patents issued by the Dutch
government.
Such difficulties are enhanced in cases in which an interna-
tional restrictive arrangement has been adroitly divided into parts,
so that its full character and significance do not appear in the por-
tion that comes within the jurisdiction of the courts of particular
countries. For example, a restrictive cartel agreement may be sup-
plemented by an agreement among the cartel members to arbitrate
all commercial disputes. This arbitral agreement may be worked
out under the laws of a country such as Switzerland, which is hos-
pitable to commercial arbitration, and may be reinforced by the
deposit of funds in Swiss banks to guarantee the payment of arbitral
awards. When a breach of the cartel agreement is brought before
such a Swiss court, there is no need to introduce the substance
of the arrangement. All that is necessary is to prove that there was
a commercial dispute, that there was an agreement to arbitrate,
and that the arbiter selected by the parties has rendered an award.
Thereupon the Swiss courts will enforce the award by a levy upon
the funds deposited for this purpose. Obviously it would be diffi-
cult for the order of an American court to upset such a scheme.
The weakness of the remedies available to a single country
appears most clearly in the type of cartel arrangement which is
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most common - that is, the allocation of world markets through
an agreement made effective by the interchange of patent rights.
A patent cartel takes advantage of the fact that a series of national
patents may be issued upon a single invention, each patent being
good only within the jurisdiction of the issuing country. When
patents are used to allocate markets, all of the relevant patents
possessed by all of the participating companies are assigned or
exclusively licensed in each country to the enterprise to which that
country's market has been allocated. Possessing in his own country
all of the patents available to the cartel, a cartel member has a
patent position in that country much stronger than he could attain
through his own patents alone. He can use patent litigation to en-
force his claims to the market not only against the other members
of the cartel but also against nonparticipants. If the patents are
strong, the system of market allocation is likely to be invulnerable
so long as the patent rights endure. When an American court under-
takes to break up such a scheme, an order which merely prevents
the future assignment or cross-licensing of patents in accord with
the scheme would be ineffective. During the life of the existing
patents, a continued enforcement of the patent rights of the cartel
members would be sufficient to continue the market allocation in
fact even though it might have been abandoned in form. Conse-
quently a divesture of patents or a general licensing thereof be-
comes necessary if the momentum of the cartel arrangement is to
be terminated. If, however, an American court orders cartel mem-
bers controlling the American market to license their American
patents generally, the effect is to open the American market to new
competition but not to permit the American companies to sell in
overseas markets. Both the American participants in the cartel and
the new licensees will find themselves subject to patent litigation
in foreign countries if they seek to export, and the patents used
against them abroad will be the counterparts of the patents thrown
open in the United States. American courts have recently sought to
minimize such effects by ordering cartel members who sell in the
American market not only to license their American patents but
also to license correlative patents which they hold abroad or, fail-
ing that, to grant American licensees immunity from suit under
these foreign patents. In any case in which there are participants
in the cartel who have not come under the jurisdiction of the
American courts, this kind of order can be only partly effective.
Moreover, as is evident in the case against Imperial Chemical In-
dustries and duPont, mentioned above, the effect may be further
reduced by the action of foreign courts, which may assert their
jurisdiction over the patents issued in their own countries and may
refuse to allow a structure of patent rights to be altered adversely
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to the interests of their own nationals pursuant to an order by an
American court.
The domestic antitrust laws of the United States have often
been effective even when applied to international problems. Wher-
ever a cartel arrangement can be effective only provided American
business enterprises collaborate in it, and wherever the arrange-
ment illegally restrains the commerce of the United States, in-
cluding its exports or its imports, the American law can be invoked
against the American participants in the scheme, including the
American branches of foreign participants, and success in elimin-
ating them from the cartel is sufficient to destroy the effectiveness
of the entire arrangement. Thus, for example, a successful prose-
cution of American members of an alkali cartel6 was apparently
sufficient to break the program of the cartel in the Brazilian and
Argentinian markets. However, when a cartel restricts American
commerce without the participation of enterprises under American
jurisdiction, American law can do nothing. Moreover, American
officials are handicapped in obtaining evidence if the operations of
the cartel are carried on beyond our boundaries and if the records
are kept there. In some instances, too, the effective destruction
of a cartel arrangement requires coordinated action reaching be-
yond United States territory, and the inability of the American
courts to control fully acts of American companies outside the
United States limits the effectiveness of the remedy. These prob-
lems are at their maximum where there is a conflict between
American law and foreign law, so that business enterprises are
subject to contradictory requirements.
With these two incentives for action -the growing significance
of cartels in American foreign policy and the developing problems
which international cartels create for domestic law enforcement-
the United States began during the war and has continued since
to seek an understanding with other countries about the cartel
problem. Study of the possibilities of international action with refer-
ence to cartels was included during the latter stages of the war in
the plans that were then being formulated for a comprehensive
postwar agreement on international economic affairs. In the early
stages of these studies, cartelization was treated as one among a
considerable number of trade barriers, public and private. In 1942,
a broad reference to trade barriers was incorporated in the master
lend lease agreement, to which the various recipients of lend lease
aid affixed their signatures. For example, the United States and
the United Kingdom agreed in February, 1942, that the eventual
settlement of lend lease claims should include
6U.S. v. United States Alkali Export Association, Inc., 86 F.Supp. 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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"...provision for agreed action by the United States of
America and the United Kingdom, open to participation by
all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion,
by appropriate international and domestic measures, of
production, employment, and the exchange and consump-
tion of goods, which are the material foundations of the
liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all
forms of discriminatory treatment in international com-
merce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade bar-
riers; ...."
In 1943, the Trade Agreements Act of 1934 was amended to include
a proviso that the President may suspend the application of the
reduced duties to the goods of any country
"... because of its discriminatory treatment of American
commerce or because of other acts (including the opera-
tions of international cartels) or policies which in his
opinion tend to defeat the purposes set forth in this sec-
tion; ...."8
At the close of hostilities, the concern of the United States with
cartel policy overseas was further expressed in a program of de-
cartelization included in the policies of the American occupation
of both Germany and Japan. In both countries, procedures were
adopted to reduce the size and power of the largest business enter-
prises and to remove the legal basis for monopolistic business agree-
ments, both national and international. In both countries, too, the
occupation authorities brought about the enactment of laws in-
tended to curb monopoly and sought to encourage the adoption of
an antimonopoly policy not limited to the period of the occupation.
Negotiations to create an international trade organization,
with the curbing of cartels as one of its purposes, were undertaken
even before hostilities ended. They culminated in 1947-48 in a con-
ference in Havana, attended by representatives of 57 nations. The
conference produced a draft charter, which, however, has not been
ratified and is no longer under active consideration by govern-
ments. This charter undertook to deal comprehensively with prob-
lems of employment and labor standards, development and re-
construction, tariffs, preferences, quantitative restrictions, sub-
sidies, state trading, intergovernmental commodity agreements,
and restrictive business practices. Its provisions with reference to
the latter contained an undertaking by each government to co-
7 Article VII, "Agreement between Governments of the United States of
America and of the United Kingdom on the Principles Applying to Mutual
Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against Aggression, Authorized and Pro-
vided for by the Act of March 11, 1941," signed February 23, 1942. 56 STAT.
1433 (1942).8 Section 350 (a) (2), Joint Resolution to Extend the Authority of the
President under Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. 57 STAT.
1 (194,3).
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operate with the others and with an international organization to
prevent business practices affecting international trade "which
restrain competition, limit access to markets, or foster monopolistic
control, wherever such practices have harmful effects on the expan-
sion of production or trade and interfere with the achievement of" 9
certain objectives set forth in the charter. This undertaking was
to be given effect by procedures for consultation between mem-
bers, for investigation of complaints, and for the conduct of studies
having to do with restrictive practices and related matters. An
international organization was to receive complaints, assemble in-
formation and analyze it, decide whether harmful effects were
present, recommend remedial action if it wished to do so, and report
the action taken. The participating countries, however, were to
carry out all the investigations and to determine their own course
of action in the light of the findings and recommendations of the
international body.
The United States did not wait for a comprehensive treatment
of cartel problems such as was contemplated by the Havana charter.
Instead, it began in 1948 to provide for the treatment of cartel
problems in the conduct of its daily international relations. The
Economic Cooperation Act of that year was designed to foster
recovery through American aid. Under this statute, bilateral agree-
ments were made with various countries. In 26 such agreements,
there was a standard provision binding the recipient country to the
general principle that had already been set forth in the draft
Havana charter. For example, paragraph 3 of Article II of the
agreement with Norway, signed in July, 1948, provided that,
"3. The Royal Norwegian Government will take the meas-
ures which it deems appropriate, and will cooperate with
other participating countries, to prevent, on the part of
private or public commercial enterprises, business prac-
tices or business arrangements affecting international trade
which restrain competition, limit access to markets or fos-
ter monopolistic control, whenever such practices or ar-
rangements have the effect of interfering with the achieve-
ment of the joint program of European recovery."' 0
An annex to this agreement defined the business practices to which
the program referred in language which (except for the final sub-
paragraph) was taken directly from the Havana charter, as follows:
"(a) fixing prices, terms or conditions to be observed
in dealing with others in the purchase, sale or lease of any
product;
9 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mlarch 24, 1948,
U.S. Department of State. p. 86.
10Economic Cooperation Agreement with Norway, signed July 3, 1948.
62 STAT. (2)2514 (1948); TIA.S. 1792.
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"(b) excluding enterprises from, or allocating or di-
viding, any territorial market or field of business activity,
or allocating customers, or fixing sales quotas or purchase
quotas;
"(c) discriminating against particular enterprises;
"(d) limiting production or fixing production quotas;
"(e) preventing by agreement the development or
application of technology or invention whether patented or
unpatented;
"(f) extending the use of rights under patents, trade
marks or copyrights granted by either country to matters
which, according to its laws and regulations, are not with-
in the scope of such grants, or to products or conditions
of production, use or sale which are likewise not the sub-
jects of such grants;
"(g) such other practices as the two governments
may agree to include.""
In 1950, a program to guarantee investment abroad was un-
dertaken as a part of the recovery effort. In practice, applications
for guarantees have been screened in an effort to assure that the
proposed* investments are consistent with the policy against cartels.
In 1951, in adopting the Mutual Security Act, the Congress
included therein the so-called Benton amendment, which declared
it to be the policy of Congress that the Act be administered in such
a way as
"...to the extent that it is feasible and does not inter-
fere with the achievement of the purposes set forth in this
Act, to discourage the cartel and monopolistic business
practices prevailing in certain countries receiving aid un-
der this Act which result in restricting production and in-
creasing prices, and to encourage where suitable compe-
tition and productivity .... ,"1 2
In the following year, this provision was supplemented by the
so-called Moody amendment to the Economic Cooperation Act,
which earmarked a substantial portion of the appropriated funds
to be expended in furthering the objectives of the Benton amend-
ment. In 1953, the Benton and Moody amendments were both elim-
inated, but provision was made that commitments and agreements
which had been entered into under the Moody amendment would
be carried out. In lieu of the Benton amendment, the Congress
adopted the so-called Thye amendment, which declared it to be
the policy of the United States,
"... to encourage the efforts of other free countries in fos-
tering private initiative and competition, in discouraging
monopolistic practices, in improving the technical effici-
I Ibid, paragraph 3 of the Annex.
12 PuB. L. No. 165, 82nd CoNG., ist Ssss. Chapter 479, § 516 (1951). Other
provisions of the amendment sought to foster free private enterprise to en-
courage free labor unions and collective bargaining.
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ency of their industry, agriculture, and commerce, and in
the strengthening of iree labor unions; .... -13
One signiticiant effect of the Benton amendment has been to
influence the policies of the United States in off-shore procurement
of military supplies. American procurement officers were instructed
to buy through channels which minimized the risk that restrictive
business practices would inflate prices, hamper delivery, or impede
production. They were instructed to negotiate in so far as possible
with individual firms rather than trade associations or joint sales
offices, to give preference to independent companies without re-
strictive affiliations, and actively to foster competition among bid-
ders.14
In 1948, the United States also began to include provisions
about monopoly in its treaties of friendship, commerce, and navi-
gation. Thus far such provisions have appeared in treaties with
Colombia, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, and
Uruguay. Although there are minor variations in wording, the
provision in the treaty with Ireland may be regarded as fairly
representative. It reads as follows:
"1. The two parties agree that business practices
which restrain competition, limit access to markets or fos-
ter monopolistic control, and which are engaged in or made
effective by one or more private or public commercial en-
terprises or by combination, agreement or other arrange-
ment among such enterprises may have harmful effects
upon commerce between their respective territories. Ac-
cordingly, each party agrees upon the request of the other
party to consult with respect to any such practices and to
take such measures as it deems appropriate with a view
to eliminating such harmful effects."'u
In 1948, the President approved a public loan policy for the
United States, which had been developed by the National Advisory
Council. This policy provided that
"... 'credits should not strengthen or extend business ar-
rangements or practices (whether engaged in by public or
private commercial enterprises) affecting international
trade which restrain competition, limit access to markets
or foster monopolistic controls.' The policy outlined in this
document also indicates that the United States will seek to
discourage private investments which strengthen interna-
tional private cartels.' 6
13 PuE. L. No. 118, 83d CONG., 1st SEss. Chapter 195, § 710 (1953).
14 Foreign Legislation Concerning Monopoly and Cartel Practices, Re-
port of the Department of State to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the
Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, July 9, 1952, p. 178.
Is Article XV, Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Ire-
land, signed January 21, 1950. 2 U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S. 2155.16 Foreign Legislation Concerning Monopoly and Cartel Practices, Report
of the Department of State to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select
Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, July 9, 1952, p. 177.
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In 1949, the Department of State released to the press a formal
statement as to United States policy with respect to elimination of
cartel and other trade restrictions. It read, in part, as follows:
"One aspect of this Government's foreign economic
policy is the elimination of cartel and other private restric-
tions on the growth of international trade ....
"At the present time, we are much concerned that the
growth of such private arrangements may hamper the pro-
gram for European recovery. Our program in Europe seeks
to establish a higher standard of living and viability of the
European economy. These objectives, we feel, can only be
gained by increased efficiency and productivity of Euro-
pean industry, stimulated by the creation of a broader
competitive market. They cannot be attained if private re-
strictive arrangements to fix prices, divide territories of
sale or limit production simply replace government bar-
riers such as quotas and tariffs. In addition, cartel arrange-
ments, by preventing sales by European firms to hard
currency areas, can interfere with efforts to overcome the
dollar deficiencies of the participating countries."1 7
In 1951, an executive order was issued,' establishing proce-
dures for the procurement of strategic materials for stockpiling in
the United States. In the application of this order, procurement of-
ficials have, where possible, used or developed sources of supply
that are not under cartel control. In many procurement contracts
they have included a provision by which
"The contractor covenants that it will not enter into
any business arrangements, with private or pubic commer-
cial enterprises located either in (country) or in any other
part of the world, restraining competition in the production
and distribution of (material), limiting the access to mar-
kets of any enterprise engaged in the production and dis-
tribution of (material), or fostering monopolistic control
over the production and distribution of (material)."9
In language borrowed from the Havana charter, this provision then
lists the types of arrangements which are to be regarded as cover-
ed by the undertaking.
These specific applications of anti-cartel policy have been sup-
plemented by broad efforts to stimulate an interest abroad in the
competitive practices of American business and to encourage en-
actment of antimonopoly laws in foreign countries. The most im-
portant aspects of these policies have been described by the De-
partment of State in a report to a Senate Committee as follows:
"Through the technical assistance program of the Mu-
tual Security Agency, the United States has arranged for
the visit of many technical experts from European indus-
17 Department of State Press Release No. 939, Dec. 1, 1949.
l8 sEc. ODER No. 10281, 16 FED. REG. 8789 (1951).
19 E.C.A. Standard Form Exploration Contract No. 2.
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try to the United States to provide them with technological
information of value in improving the productivity of their
industries. MSA's recently inaugurated Production Assis-
tance Drive is an intensified program to demonstrate to
European industry the advantages of an expanding econ-
omy operated on a competitive basis. The program contem-
plates that use of counterpart funds and United States
technical assistance to stimulate the development in several
key participating countries of special programs to increase
productivity, to improve business practices, and to pro-
vide a share in the resulting benefits among ownership,
labor, and consumers.
"The United States has also encouraged the adoption
of foreign legislation against restrictive business prac-
tices. Our overseas missions have assisted interested for-
eign governments in the preparation of legislation against
restrictive business practices by making available pertinent
information. In the case of the United Kingdom, France,
and Germany, arrangements were made for teams of ex-
perts to visit the United States to study the antitrust laws
and their administration. '20
Thus United States policy toward cartels since the war has
had four aspects. First, an effort has been made to develop a sys-
tematic cooperative attack by governments upon the cartel prob-
lem. Second, agreements with particular countries have included
provisions defining policy toward cartels in broad terms. Third,
programs as to loans, technical assistance, and procurement have
been administered in an effort to reduce the strength of cartels.
Fourth, information services, productivity teams, and diplomatic
contacts have been used to encourage the development of anti-
monopoly legislation in other countries.
In 1951, with the Havana charter dormant, the United States
began a second effort to develop a general program of international
cooperation about cartels. Other aspects of the broad program of
the Havana charter had become the subject of separate endeavors.
Tariffs and quantitative restrictions were being reduced so far as
possible under the Trade Agreements Act and through the inter-
national secretariat established to give effect to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade negotiated in 1947. Economic develop-
ment was being fostered by the Point IV program and also by the
technical assistance program of the United Nations. Efforts were
being made to establish an international body for the regulation
of intergovernmental commodity agreements through action by the
United Nations Economic and Social Council. But subsequent to
the drafting of the Havana charter, there had been no similar at-
2OForeign Legislation Concerning Monopoly and Cartel Practices, Report
of the Department of State to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select
Committee on Small Business, United States Senate, July 9, 1952, pp. 177-8.
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tempt to establish a broad international program about monopolies.
At a meeting of the Economic and Social Council at Geneva
in 1951, the United States proposed a resolution designed to re-
vive the cartel provisions of the Havana charter. It recommended
that governments cooperate against restrictive business practices
that had harmful effects, and provided for an ad hoc committee
to submit proposals to the Council for methods of implementing this
recommendation. Preliminary negotiations indicated that there
was a difference of opinion within the Council as to whether any
such program should be established within the United Nations or
as an adjunct to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Ac-
cordingly, the resolution was expanded to instruct the Secretary-
General of the United Nations to seek the views of intergovern-
mental bodies or agencies as to the organization which could most
appropriately undertake the work, and thereafter to make a rec-
ommendation to the Council. Negotiation also indicated that some
countries were anxious to have the ad hoc committee's report
summarize the facts about restrictive business practices in inter-
national trade and governmental measures concerning them, as
well as set forth proposals for action. Accordingly, the resolution
was modified to provide for a factual report. In the Council debate
on the resolution, the only expressions of hostility came from the
three countries of the Soviet bloc, whose representatives argued
that the proponents of the resolution were hypocritical and that the
purpose of the United States was to enable American business, al-
ready monopolistic, to acquire a broader control of overseas mar-
kets. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 13 to 3, with Mexico
and Chile abstaining.
In its final form, the central principle of the resolution con-
sisted of a recommendation to states members of the United Na-
tions
"that they take appropriate measures, and cooperate
with each other, to prevent, on the part of private or pub-
lic commercial enterprises, business practices affecting in-
ternational trade which restrain competition, limit access
to markets, or foster monopolistic control, whenever such
practices have harmful effects on the expansion of pro-
duction or trade, on the economic development of under-
developed areas, or on standards of living;
and
"... that the measures adopted in the cases and for
the purposes stated in the preceding paragraph shall be
based on the principles set forth in Chapter V of the
Havana Charter, concerning restrictive business prac-
tices; .... 21
A committee of ten countries was set up to develop the factual
21 U.N. Doc. E/2133, adopted September 13, 1951.
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report and the proposals for methods of action. It included Bel-
gium, Canada, France, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. The representatives of
these countries, however, were not empowered to bind their gov-
ernments, but were understood to be working on an ad referendum
basis as experts developing proposals for consideration by their
own governments as well as by countries not represented on the
committee.
After sessions in New York and Geneva, the committee sub-
mitted its report early in 1953.22 At the meeting of the Economic
and Social Council in Geneva in July, 1953, the report was briefly
considered and referred to governments members of the United
Nations, as well as various specialized agencies and intergovern-
mental and nongovernmental organizations, for consideration and
comment. The Council instructed the Secretary-General to submit
his report on the proper place for the work when comments had
been received from sufficient number of governments to indicate
attitudes toward the report. The Council also decided to resume
consideration of the matter not later than the session scheduled
early in 1955.
In submitting its report, the committee set forth three proposi-
tions, which, in its opinion, underlay the resolution creating it and
had been confirmed by its work. These were:
"1. that opinions differ from country to country about
restrictive business practices and about governmental poli-
cies towards them;
"2. that restrictive business practices affecting inter-
national trade may in some circumstances have harmful
effects on the fulfilment of widely acceptable objectives
of international economic policy;
"3. that it may be difficult in such cases for appropri-
ate action to be undertaken solely by governments acting
individually. ' 23
The committee found these propositions to constitute "the solid
core of agreement in a widely varied picture," and recorded its be-
lief "that the principles of Chapter V of the Havana Charter con-
tinue to represent the widest area of agreement which can at pres-
ent be achieved on this difficult subject. '24 In accord with this be-
lief and the Council's instruction to base its work upon the Havana
charter, the committee submitted draft articles of agreement which
22 
"Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Practices to
the Economic and Social Council," U.N. Doc. E/2380, E/AC 37/3, March 30,
1953.
23 
"Restrictive Business Practices, Analysis of Governmental Measures
Relating to Restrictive Business Practices," U. N. Doc. E/2379, X/AC 37/2,
March 30, 1953, p. i.
24 Ibid, pp. i-i.
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were modeled closely upon the relevant portions of the charter. It
explained that the changes and amplifications which it had made
were, with one exception, based upon the necessity of drafting the
agreement so that it could stand alone instead of as a portion of a
larger undertaking. The sole exception was a definition of a re-
strictive business practice relating to the application of technology,
the scope of which had been somewhat enlarged.25
Like the Havana charter, the committee's proposals begin with
a broad pledge that members will cooperate to prevent restrictive
business practices affecting international trade when such practices
have harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade in
the light of various broad objectives. A list of practices is included,
identical with that of the Havana charter except that the scope of
the practice having to do with the restriction of technology has
been enlarged, as indicated above. As in the Havana charter, the
listed practices may give rise to general studies and may become
the subject of informal intergovernmental consultations. As in the
Havana charter, they are also to be subject to investigation upon
complaint if they are engaged in by public or private commercial
enterprises which possess effective control of trade among a number
of countries in one or more products. The investigative process is
conceived as one in which an international body asks participating
governments to supply information, which they will severally ob-
2S Several members of the committee regarded the definition in the Havana
charter as unduly narrow, since that definition had to do only with agree-
ments and, unlike the other provisions of the Havana charter, ignored mono-
polistic and coercive practices on the part of a single business enterprise. The
committee tried to cover such practices without impairing the discretionary
control of technology by its owner. The committee's version defines as a re-
strictive business practice "preventing by agreement or coercion the develop-
ment or application of technology or invention whether patented or unpatented,
or withholding the application of such technology with the result of mono-
polizing an industrial or commercial field." This language was understood to
subject to investigation only practices which were regarded in the United
States as violations of the Sherman Act. In discussing the change, the com-
mittee's report says:
".... It will be noted that this provision does not bring within the
definition of restrictive business practices the withholding of tech-
nology as such. In the Committee's opinion, a decision by a single
commercial enterprise to refrain from the development and commercial
application of some technological method does not, in itself, call for
investigation and could not be readily investigated. There are, how-
ever, unusual cases in which one enterprise imposes its will on an-
other, or in which the control over technology (patented or un-
patented) is so far-reaching that a restrictive exercise thereof may
create or extend a monopoly of a whole branch of trade. It is only in
these cases that the Committee believes that the technological policy
of a single enterprise may give rise to complaints which can usefully
be investigated in the manner contemplated in the draft agreement."
See "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Prac-
tices to the Economic and Social Council," U. N. Doe. E/2380, E/AC
37/3, March 30, 1953, pp. 17-18 and Annex IA p. 3.
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tain through their own governmental processes; an international
staff analyzes the information and submits a factual report; the
representatives of the participating governments determine whether
or not the facts justify a finding that there are the harmful effects
specified in the agreement, and may also, at their discretion, make
recommendations concerning the matter; and participating govern-
ments are then obligated to take action, by their own governmental
processes, to prevent such harmful effects. Provision is made for a
final public report of the situation found and the remedial action
taken.
In the development of such a program, care must be taken to
provide for effective cooperation, yet to maintain due respect for
national sovereignty and for the many differences between coun-
tries in economic conditions, laws, and governmental practices. The
draft agreement seeks this objective by entrusting to the member
states all direct relations with the business enterprises under their
jurisdiction. Member states alone are to obtain facts and take
remedial action. The international body is given no inquisitorial
power and no authority other than to report and to recommend.
To make this loose structure capable of effective action, there is
provision that members will accept not only the broad obligation
to prevent restrictive business practices that have harmful effects
but also specific obligations to obtain and furnish information, to
consider carefully the findings and recommendations of the inter-
national body, and to report fully the action they take or the
reasons for inaction. Moreover, members are to undertake to carry
out their basic obligations through all possible measures, by legis-
lation or otherwise, in accord with their constitutions or systems
of law and economic organization. In many countries, unlike the
United States, the acceptance of such obligations would require
substantial legislation to give the government adequate investiga-
tory and remedial powers. Indeed, it is noteworthy that, after the
drafting of similar provisions in the Havana charter, several Euro-
pean countries adopted or began to develop drafts of domestic laws
avowedly intended to enable these governments to carry out their
obligations under the charter. An outstanding example is the Brit-
ish Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act, which became law
in 1948.
A major problem in the establishment of an international body
such as has been proposed by the committee is the division of
functions between governmental representatives and the interna-
tional staff. Whereas the restrictive practices chapter of the Ha-
vana charter did not explore this problem in detail, because the
chapter was part of a much larger project, the committee's draft
agreement was necessarily concerned with it. The considerations
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upon which the committee's proposals were based were these:
"(a) The factual materials needed as a basis for a sound
conclusion on the question whether a restrictive business
practice has harmful effects (within the meaning of the
draft agreement) should be compiled and set out in a spirit
of independence and impartiality by persons with experi-
ence and knowledge of the issues; and advice by such per-
sons might be useful at a later stage.
"(b) The arrangements should reflect the fact that vital
trading and economic interests of governments might be
involved in the decisions of the agency and should there-
fore include provision for adequate control by the repre-
sentatives of governments. '26
The committee recorded its belief that no country would be
likely to' regard the proposals as entirely satisfactory, but indicated
that what had emerged from full discussions by representatives of
ten countries with varied problems and interests might be indica-
tive of the lines on which it is possible to resolve different national
conceptions.
A central substantive difficulty in the international treatment
of restrictive business practices is the fact that the relative scope
of public and private action varies from country to country. Activi-
ties which are wholly private in one country may be publicly auth-
orized or regulated in a second country and may be carried on by
the government in a third country. Moreover, governmental ac-
tivities are by no means always free from restrictive aspects. In the
Havana charter, which dealt at length with governmental controls
over trade, the effort to prevent restrictive business practices stood
in a setting of efforts to prevent related governmental restrictions.
In the committee's draft proposals, however, business practices
alone were under consideration. This limitation of scope necessarily
raised question as to what should be done about business practices
which were authorized by governments and as to what should be
done about restrictions which were required or directly undertaken
by governments. The committee concluded that the sovereign acts
of governments, as distinguished from the conduct of public or
private commercial enterprises, lay outside the scope of the draft
agreement and could not, in any case, be effectively curbed by the
procedures of investigation and report which were contemplated
in the draft agreement. Where governments took full responsibility
for restrictive acts, investigation of these acts by an international
body, followed by formal findings, was not regarded as appropriate.
Instead, the committee provided that the international body might,
in such cases, bring to the attention of particular governments the
2 6 
"Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Practices
to the Economic and Social Council," U. N. Doc. E/2380, E/AC 37/3, March 30,
1953, p. 21.
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bearing of their policies upon the operation of the agreement. Mem-
bers of the committee also had in mind the fact that the relation
of governmental policies to business practices would necessarily
be considered in determining whether the work upon restrictive
business practices should be placed in the United Nations, in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or elsewhere.
The committee was also confronted with the probability that in
certain cases a particular restrictive business practice might be
simultaneously forbidden, tolerated, approved, and required in
different countries. To exempt a practice from examination be-
cause it was required by one country was felt to be excessive
in view of the possibility that it might be condemned by most of
the world. The committee envisaged varying situations, ranging
from one in which a practice was required by a country which
played no significant part in the relevant international trade to
an opposite extreme in which the practice was required by coun-
tries representing nearly all of the relevant trade. Accordingly,
the committee included in the draft agreement a flexible provision
to the effect that where a practice existed in more than one coun-
try and was not specifically required in all countries in which it
was found it might be investigated at the discretion of the inter-
national body.
In considering the status of practices that are approved but not
required by governments, the committee was impressed by the
many gradations of approval which might have to be considered
if a special status were given to such practices. Furthermore, the
committee envisaged the danger that if any such special status were
created great pressure would be put upon weak governments to
grant approval to the practices of powerful business enterprises.
Accordingly, the committee agreed to recommend that no special
status be given to approved practices as distinguished from prac-
tices that were specifically required. It contemplated, however, that
approval by governments and the reasons for such approval would
be among the relevant facts which would normally be ascertained
and evaluated in determining whether or not a given practice had
harmful effects.
The most substantial difference between the committee's pro-
posals and the policies of the American antitrust laws lies in the
fact that the draft agreement condemns restrictive business prac-
tices only where they are shown to have certain harmful effects.
In this respect, the agreement follows the principle of the Havana
charter and differs from the principle of the antitrust laws, which
condemn conspiracies to restrain trade and monopolies because of
their anticompetitive effect, without requiring an evaluation of the
bearing of such arrangements upon ultimate social objectives. In
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
evident that few countries outside the United States were willing
the negotiations which evolved the Havana charter, it had become
to condemn business practices on the sole ground that they im-
paired or destroyed competition. In countries with social-demo-
cratic governments, the principle of competition was suspect al-
though private monopoly was condemned. In various other coun-
tries, particularly in Europe, there was a belief that particular
cartels and monopolies might operate moderately in the public
interest and that no presumption should be established against
them in advance of an examination of the facts in each instance.
The same attitudes were apparent in the debate in the Economic
and Social Council in 1951 and in the deliberations of the ad hoc
committee. Thus it was obvious that whereas governments might
be able to agree that particular monopolistic arrangements were
harmful and should be eliminated, they would not be able to agree
in advance that a competitive standard should be established. Both
in the development of the Havana charter and in the formulation of
the committee's report, the representatives of the United States
accepted the test of harmful effect in the expectation that it would
make possible a useful cooperative attack upon the worst monopoly
practices and would afford to governments without experience in
the investigation of monopolistic practices the basis for develop-
ment of a public policy which might in time broaden the area of
agreement and coordinated action.
In the immediate future, the committee's report will be con-
sidered by the governments of the United Nations, including the
United States Government. Presumably, it will be among the mat-
ters brought before the committee recently established by the Presi-
dent to evaluate foreign economic policy. Questions which will
necessarily confront the committee are:
1. Shall the United States continue its leadership in seeking to
bring about the elimination of monopolistic practices in interna-
tional trade and in overseas markets through multilateral and bi-
lateral understandings with other governments?
2. If so, does the committee's report afford a useful basis for a
beginning of multilateral action; and if the committee's report
should be found unacceptable, can an alternative be developed
which affords equal or better chance that national policies designed
to eliminate such practices will be reinforced by international co-
operative action?
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